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Abstract 
To increase labour market participation is a major challenge currently faced by the EU, and 
attracting women into the labour force appears as a promising avenue to do so. Therefore, a 
clear understanding of what the factors influencing the evolution of female participation rates 
are in Europe is essential for a successful design of policy measures aiming at increasing 
participation rates. This paper provides empirical evidence on the role that institutions have 
played in determining participation rates of women in the European labour markets. Our 
findings discard any doubt on the influence of institutions on women’s participation in Europe. 
The strictness of labour market institutions negatively affects female participation rates. We also 
find that institutional features aimed at reconciling motherhood with professional life such as 
maternity leave schemes and part-time work favour participation rates of prime-age women. 
Additionally, fertility rates and education enrolment have been relevant for the evolution of 
participation rates during the sample period considered for prime-age and young females 
respectively, while cohort effects drive the developments of older females.  
 
Keywords: labour force participation, labour market institutions. JEL-Code: J21 
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Central Bank (ECB). We would like to thank Neale Kennedy, Barbara Petrongolo, Jarkko Turunen and Etienne 
Wasmer for useful comments. Any errors are of course the sole responsibility of the authors.  * Kaisserstrasse 29, 
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1
“Despite their gains, women remain perhaps the world’s most under-utilised resource.” 
The Economist, April 15th-21st 2006 
1. Introduction   
More than ever European women are attracting a lot of attention in the context of labour 
markets performance, because they appear to be an ideal target group to increase labour market 
participation rates and, therefore, labour supply. 
Increasing participation rates is a major challenge currently faced by the European Union (EU) 
to move towards the targets set by the Lisbon European Council and achieve a more growth 
oriented, dynamic and competitive economy. This indeed calls for an effort to boost labour 
force participation and requires a substantial increase in employment, drawing not only from 
unemployed but also from inactives. 
Moreover, increasing participation rates could contribute to alleviate the potential problem of 
scarcity of labour stemming from the gradual ageing of the European population. A recent 
policy debate in Europe focuses on harmful consequences of ageing; and several academic 
papers have analysed this issue,2 concluding that the potential scarcity of labour associated with 
the ageing of the population in Europe may jeopardise the sustainability of public pension 
systems and could have negative effects on productivity and growth.3
Attracting female labour supply into the labour force appears as a promising (and potentially 
fruitful) avenue to increase participation rates in the EU. Women indeed form the largest group 
from which to draw additional resources as they gather about two-thirds of the inactive 
population.  This fraction is even larger among the high skill “inactives“: 75% of inactives aged 
25 to 49 and holding a university degree are women. Of course, increasing female participation 
could become a concern if it would come coupled with lower fertility rates, thus aggravating the 
ageing problem in the long term. However, a well-documented fact in the recent literature is that 
the European countries with higher female participation are the ones that exhibit the highest 
fertility rates in Europe, namely the Nordic countries and the Netherlands. The opposite 
situation characterises Mediterranean countries, which combine low participation and low 
fertility rates.4
In order to successfully design policy measures that could help attracting women into the labour 
force, thereby increasing participation rates, policy makers need to understand what the factors 
influencing the evolution of female participation rates are. In particular, disentangling the 
 
2 See for example Börsch-Supan (2003, 2005)and  Hamermesh (2001).
3 Several measures aiming at increasing labour market participation have been proposed in this context, for 
example increasing participation of the older workers by delaying the retirement age or attracting more 
immigrants. 
4 See for example Pissarides et al.. (2005) and Del Boca et al. (2005). This fact also holds for a larger sample of 
countries as featured by The Economist April 15th-21st 2006, in the article entitled “A guide to Womenomics”.  
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2
relationship between female participation rates and labour market institutions in the EU is a 
relevant prerequisite for reforming legal and institutional frameworks to encourage participation 
of women. The aim of this paper is precisely to provide empirical evidence of the role that 
institutions, among other factors, have played to shape the evolution of female participation 
rates in Europe. Additionally, by focusing on institutions, the evidence presented in this paper 
sheds some light on the current debate on whether Europeans work little due to preferences or 
due to institutional features. 
The analysis is performed by estimating reduced form participation equations for three different 
age groups of women (young (15-24 years old), prime-age (25-54) and older age groups (55-
64)) using annual macro data for a panel of 12 of the EU-15 countries between the early 1980s 
and 2000 and accounting for economic, social and institutional factors.5 During this period 
labour market participation in the EU-15 has increased from around 65% to nearly 70% in 2000 
(see Chart 1), led by the positive contribution of female participation, which grew by more than 
12 percentage points to reach around 60% in 2000. 
We are interested in questions like: (i) Why is participation rate of women and its evolution so 
different across countries? (ii) Do labour institutions play a role in explaining these differences? 
(iii) Does this role vary for different age groups? and (iv) What other factors are also relevant 
for participation rates developments? We will study the evolution of participation rates for 
different groups of women across a set of European countries and the role that labour market 
institutions and other factors play on shaping that evolution, rather than addressing issues 
related to the participation decisions of particular individuals, for which micro panel data will be 
better suited.6
The fact that we focus on institutions also favours the use of macro data for the analysis. Since 
the dataset compiled by Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) and Nickell and Nunziata (2001) has 
become available, many papers have looked into the impact of institutions on European 
unemployment and employment developments.7 This paper is among the first ones to look at the 
role that institutions could play on participation rates developments.8 Other examples are 
Blöndal and Scarpetta (1999) who analyse retirement decisions. Jaumotte (2003) also looks at 
females’ participation, but rather than on labour market institutions, she mainly focuses on the 
effects of childcare support.    
 
5 Countries include Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden and the UK.  Austria, Greece and Luxembourg are not part of our sample due to data availability 
constraints. 
6 There is a large literature on female labour supply from a microeconomics perspective. See for example the 
special issue of the Journal of Population Economics, August 2002, and references therein. 
7 See for example Nickell (1997), Elmeskov et al. (1998), Belot and van Ours (2000, 2001), Bertola et al. (2003),  
Jimeno and Rodriguez-Palenzuela (2001) and Nunziata (2002), etc. 
8 For a rough look at determinants of participation and gender differences on participation rates in Europe, see 
Genre et al (2005). 
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3
The separate analysis for each one of the relevant age groups can be easily justified. For 
example, factors such as social protection are important determinants for old women, while 
childcare availability could be determinants for prime-age women but irrelevant for the old 
ones.  
Our findings discard any doubt on the influence of institutions on women’s participation in 
Europe. Institutional factors affect female participation decisions and therefore the dynamics of 
worked hours per capita and, in turn, GDP per capita and economic growth in the EU. However 
the degree to which these institutions shape or interact with preferences is outside the scope of 
this paper. 
In particular, the strictness of labour market institutions negatively affects the participation 
decisions in the three groups considered. Indeed, changes in rules or in features that increased 
the overall flexibility of labour market institutions in many European countries in recent years 
(e.g. declining union density, decreasing employment protection, tightening of eligibility criteria 
for unemployment benefits, etc.) have generally supported female participation. We also find 
that institutional features aimed at reconciling motherhood with professional life, such as 
maternity leave schemes, favour participation of prime-age women.  
More linked to preferences, but also to social norms and institutions, fertility and education 
enrolment have been relevant in determining the evolution of participation rates during the 
sample period considered for prime-age and young females respectively, while the extensive use 
of part-time employment has been relevant for both age groups. Finally, cohort effects appear to 
be crucial to understand the developments in participation rates for oldest females.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the empirical model and discusses how the 
overall institutional framework and other variables traditionally suggested by economic theory 
are expected to influence labour market participation of women. Section 3 discusses the 
estimation results. Section 4 reviews the main findings and gives some conclusions. 
2. Empirical model 
To model participation rates, we need to take into account that it is a variable bounded between 
zero and one. We do so by specifying the regression of participation rates of each age group on
the conditioning variables, for country i and period t, as E(PRit) = F ('Xit + 3Zit  + bt+ci), where 
F is a probability distribution function. If F is chosen to be a logistic function, this model will 
lead to a linear equation with the logit transformation of participation rates as the dependent 
variable:9 Log (PRit / 1- PRit )= 'Xit+ 3Zit  + bt+ci + it  , where bt and ci are period and country 
effects respectively.  
 
9 The estimations in this paper were also performed using the actual (non-transformed) participation rate as 
dependent variable, the results did not show any relevant changes with respect to the ones presented in the paper.  
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4
The explanatory variables may be organised into two main groups. Vector Zit gathers variables 
traditionally suggested by standard economic theory and usually found in empirical studies. 
Vector Xit is meant to bring together variables reflecting the institutional framework ruling 
European labour markets. 
For all age groups, the vector of market institutions Xit includes the following elements:  union 
density, employment protection, unemployment benefit systems and labour taxes, all of them 
taken from Nickel and Nunziata (2001). In addition, this vector includes a number of 
institutional features that are thought to be specific to each age group and will be discussed in 
more detail in Section 3. 
To discuss the relevance of the institutional framework as a determinant of female participation 
decisions one should bear in mind that prime-age males could be seen as insiders because they 
show a more stable attachment to the labour market, while women of all ages tend to be less 
attached to the labour market and can be seen as outsiders.   
Union density is one of the institutional features we consider as a potentially determining factor 
of women´s participation.10 As a rule, we expect more unionised economies to display lower 
average participation rates among the less attached workers, e.g. women. As involvement of 
unions in the wage bargaining leads to a higher wage compression and larger employment 
differences between insiders and outsiders, it will have an impact on the expectations of 
outsiders to get a job.  During the 1980s and the 1990s, union density has declined in many 
countries, including Italy, Germany, France, the Netherlands and the UK among others, and 
may have favoured a convergence in participation rates among age and gender groups.11 By 
contrast, it has increased or remained broadly unchanged in Spain and the Nordic countries. 
Employment protection is another institutional feature that should play an important role in 
determining participation, while the overall influence may go in any direction. A stringent 
employment protection framework should restrain employers’ willingness to hire and fire 
workers. As a result, employment, hence, participation rates of workers with numerous lapses of 
inactivity should be negatively affected. At the same time, employment protection is also meant 
to provide a positive incentive to participate in a labour market where risks of getting 
unemployed are smaller. In general, employment protection is high in all European countries, 
being Ireland and the UK the main exceptions, but the strictness of it has significantly declined 
over the last two decades in most countries, such as Denmark, Belgium, Germany and Spain. 
The potential effects of unemployment benefits on participation follow a similar mechanism to 
the one of employment protection. On the one hand, the existence of a generous unemployment 
 
10 We have considered, at an early stage, the degree of wage bargaining co-ordination, but it was found to be 
insignificant in the estimations and, in general, highly correlated with other institutions. 
11 It should be noted that this is a quite imperfect measure of unionisation. There are countries with low affiliation 
rates like Spain or France where union agreements apply to all workers at a national level.  
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5
benefit system could be seen as a positive incentive to participate in the labour market from the 
workers´ viewpoint. On the other hand, a generous unemployment benefit system can strengthen 
union bargaining strategies and consequently reduce outsiders´ employment rates and indirectly, 
their participation rates. Unemployment benefits may be described by two variables: the income 
replacement ratio and benefit duration. Replacement ratios generally decreased in the last two 
decades, although this has varied across countries. Germany, the UK, Ireland, France and 
Belgium are among those that recorded a decline, while in Italy, Portugal and Finland the 
replacement rate increased. Developments in unemployment benefit duration during the last two 
decades have varied significantly across European countries: some have extended it, such as 
Portugal, Ireland and Denmark, some have reduced it, such as Finland and the Netherlands.  
Finally, labour taxes are also expected to play a role determining women’s participation. Any 
increase in taxes leading to lower net wages will tend to increase participation in order to keep 
the income level constant. However, the substitution effect (cheaper leisure) will tend to lower 
participation. Micro evidence on the role of taxes can be found for instance in Gustafsson 
(1992), who analysed the disincentives that certain taxation systems may induce on participation 
using Sweden and Germany as case studies. He founds that joint income taxes decrease 
incentives for married women to work if the tax system is progressive, as the marginal tax rate 
of the wife that considers to start working is large. By contrast, a change to separate individual 
taxation, combined with reforms in childcare and parental leave systems, should translate in an 
increase in the participation of married women. Labour taxes show in general a high dispersion 
among EU-15 countries and have increased in all countries (but the Netherlands, Norway and 
the UK) in the last two decades. In other words, the evolution of labour taxes is not expected to 
have favoured a reduction in the gap of participation rates across age groups. 
Closely related to institutional factors, labour market programmes are also expected to have 
some influence on female participation. This influence could be direct, by allowing individuals 
to qualify for unemployment benefits, or indirect, by increasing the probability to find a job 
after participating in the programme. We use the OECD database on labour market programmes 
and  concentrate in active labour market programmes (ALMP), in particular, in those policies 
that have been found in the literature relevant for females (see  Martin and Grubb,  2001).  
The vector Zit contains variables suggested by economic theory that are usually found in 
empirical studies. Economic theory gives a central role to potential earnings or potential wages 
as a determinant of participation.12 If potential earnings in the market (relative to home 
productivity) increase, participation decisions will be influenced by an income effect and a 
substitution effect. Labour market participation will increase if the positive substitution effect is 
larger than the income effect. For instance, Katz and Murphy (1992) have documented how 
Page 6 of 31
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
6
changes in the wage structure and labour market returns have influenced the increase of the 
labour supply of married women in the US in the second half of the 20th century.  
In practice, it is very difficult to find adequate variables to measure potential earnings of each 
group of women considered. Average wages for a specific group of women could reflect skill 
composition and self-selection rather than participation behaviour. An alternative measure used 
in the literature is the level of education of the relevant group.13 In the case of women, this 
variable is likely to capture not only higher potential wages associated to higher human capital, 
but also preferences, women with higher education, who have invested more in human capital 
accumulation are likely to have higher preferences for market production. However, 
disentangling these potential effects is very difficult and in general the coefficient of education 
in participation equations cannot be interpreted as capturing exclusively potential earnings. In 
addition to the above mentioned shortcomings, it should be added the lack of valid data. 
Measures of average wages by gender and age group are not available for our sample. In the 
case of education, some comparable indicators exist across countries but only as 5 year 
averages.14 
The prevailing economic conditions are also expected to influence participation decisions. To 
control for the economic business cycle we included the overall unemployment rate. We prefer 
this labour market-related proxy to capture business cycle developments to alternative measures 
because it is expected to better capture cyclical labour market pressures than other business 
cycle indicators.15. Due to its potential problem of endogeneity we instrumented the overall 
unemployment rate using lags, real productivity, and a measure of the output gap. Additionally, 
we include average aggregate real wages, which are expected to account also for the general 
macro economic and labour market conditions 
Furthermore, while general economic conditions are relevant, more structural sectoral 
developments should not be overlooked. The relative importance of service activities in the EU-
15 has increased, fostering certain types of occupation and work arrangements (e.g. part-time 
jobs) that are expected to favour female participation.   
Finally, due to the nature of our data the error term in our equations, it , is likely to suffer from 
autocorrelation. Indeed, as population moves in and out of each age group over time, there will 
be a kind of cohort effect that could be responsible for autocorrelation. The inclusion of lags of 
 
12 The participation decision of women is usually modelled as women choosing between market work, household 
work and leisure. See, for example, the work of Becker (1991). 
13 One major drawback of education measures used as proxies of human capital is that it does not take into account 
on-the-job training and accumulated experience. 
14 See Barro and Lee (2000) and De la Fuente and Domenech (2006). 
15 Nevertheless, in our estimations using output gap delivers similar results.  Bover and Arellano (1995) also use 
unemployment rate to capture the effect of the business cycle when estimating participation rates of Spanish 
women. 
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7
the dependent variable among the explanatory variables would likely bias the estimations by 
capturing these slow moving components of the error. Instead, estimations are performed using 
feasible GLS allowing for autoregressive, AR(1), and heteroskedastic residuals.  
3. Results  
In this section we estimate participation equations for three different age groups of women using 
time series of annual macro data over the 80s and 90s for a panel of 12 EU-15 countries. The 
panel is unbalanced for some of the explanatory variables. 
3.1. Participation rates of prime-age women 
Within each country prime-age women are the most active ones, with the remarkable exception 
of the Netherlands where young and prime age women have similar participation rates.16
On average in the 1990s, participation rates of prime age women in the 12 countries of our 
sample rank from below 60% in Spain, Ireland and Italy to well over 80% in Finland, Sweden 
and Denmark.  
The main specificity of this age group is that it includes the period of the life cycle during which 
women have children. Indeed, in 2000, the average age of European women at the birth of the 
first child ranged from nearly 27 years old in Portugal to almost 30 years old in the Netherlands. 
Having a family, and especially having small children, conditions the choice of women between 
market  and home production, as it implies more opportunities for the latter. Consequently, 
when estimating the participation equation for this group one needs to account for the 
relationship between fertility and participation decisions. In addition to the general determinants 
of female participation rates discussed in the previous section, we therefore include fertility 
rates among the explanatory variables. In fact, having children and participating in the labour 
force could be understood as joint decisions. If this were the case, fertility rates and 
participation rates should be modelled simultaneously. It could be argued however that having 
children and participating are not simultaneous decisions, but that the fertility decisions precede 
participation decisions. Then, only when motherhood and work turn out to be difficult to 
conciliate, women leave the job market.17 Also, causality is more likely to go from fertility rates 
to participation rates because having children is a permanent decision, while participation is 
reversible, and therefore can be adjusted in the short run.  If the latter arguments were the 
correct ones, fertility rates should enter as an exogenous regressor in the equation of 
participation rates. The empirical literature does not provide strong evidence to take a stance on 
 
16 The extended use of flexible working arrangements in the Netherlands allows young people to conciliate studying 
and working activities. 
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this issue. Some studies suggests that motherhood responsibilities constrain labour force 
participation - see, for example, Xie (1997) or Kumar Narayan and Smyth (2006). While other 
studies rather suggest that women participation decisions could be  good predictor of their 
expected fertility. Mc Nown and Ridao-Cano (2005) carefully explore the endogeneity issue 
between fertility and labour force participation variables for the UK, running Granger causality 
tests that show evidence of extensive feedback between the two variables. Consequently, we do 
not think that fertility and participation are simultaneous decisions neither that fertility rates are 
fully exogenous. To model women’s participation rates we will take an intermediate approach, 
trying to alleviate potential endogeneity biases by instrumenting fertility rates.  
Other specific determinants of participation for this group are institutional features that help 
reconciling motherhood and market production, like maternal/parental leave or more generally 
the availability of childcare services. In this case it could be also argued that childcare services 
could be endogenous, in the sense that they are more likely to be available in countries where 
women participate in the labour force, thus implying that the provision of childcare is demand 
driven.  However, scarcity of childcare services seems to be common in most of the countries of 
our sample (see for example Wrohlich (2005) for Germany, Choné et al (2003) for France and 
Chevalier and Viitanen (2003) for the UK). Additionally, Chevalier and Viitanen (2002) show 
that childcare (granger) causes participation in the United Kingdom, but the reverse does not 
hold.  In other words, childcare seems to be supply driven, which let us to safely assume that the 
direction of the causality goes from childcare availability to female participation. 
Together with maternal/parental leave and the availability of childcare, the possibility of taking 
up a part-time job, could play an essential role on the arbitrage faced by prime age women 
between leisure, market work and home production, by enabling women to reconcile 
motherhood with professional life.18 Therefore, these features are expected to have a positive 
impact on prime age female participation and are included in our equation specifications. 
Estimation results for prime age women are presented in Table 1. Labour market institutions 
appear to be relevant for participation decisions of this group. The estimation coefficients of the 
unemployment benefit variables (both, replacement ratio and duration) and union density are 
negative, significant and very stable across specifications, while employment protection is 
found not to be significant. Labour taxes, as measured in Nickell and Nunziata (2001), i.e. 
country average tax revenues including income and consumption taxes, do not appear 
statistically significant. Column 4 shows the results with an alternative measure of tax burden, 
namely income tax net of cash benefits, which excludes consumption tax. The estimate 
 
17 This is confirmed by evidence on the activity rates of women, which drops significantly after the birth of the second 
child. In 2005, the activity rate of European women aged 20 to 49 years old with no children reached 77%. It drops 
by 5 percentage points (p.p.) for women with one child of pre-school age; by 19 p.p. with two children; and by 37 
p.p. with 3 or more children. 
18 Recent studies using micro data have found evidence in support of this; see for example Del Boca et al. (2005).  
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9
coefficient for this variable is equally non-significant in our regression. These results were 
somehow expected, because both measures are country average tax revenues, while the relevant 
variable to capture the impact of taxes on prime age female participation should perhaps refer to 
the second earner in the household. This tax rate is not available for our sample due to the fact 
that some of the countries have family taxation and it is not possible to allocate the various tax 
reliefs between household partners. Additionally, there are difficulties to make comparable the 
different tax income legislation across countries. Nevertheless, an interesting attempt to 
construct a measure of second earner tax rate for OECD countries has been made in Jaumotte 
(2003).19 We also introduced this variable in our estimations, but it turned out having a non-
significant coefficient. As regards ALMP that may have an impact in this group, OECD 
measures of total expenditure on ALMP, expenditure on  training programmes and on 
employment subsidies,  each one of them as percentage of GDP,  turned out to be non-
significant in our estimations.  
Concerning other institutional features as childcare support, maternity/parental leave measured 
in weeks (taken from Gauthier and Bortnik, 2001) seem to have an encouraging effect on 
participation if the leave is not too long. According to our estimations, the effect of 
maternity/parental leave becomes negative after approximately 8 to 9 months.20 We encountered 
difficulties to find proxies for other kinds of childcare support for our sample. We tried three 
different variables to account for childcare availability and child benefits, namely public 
childcare expenditure per child in formal day care from Jaumotte (2003), family allowances per 
child (Gauthier, 2003) and public expenditure in child benefits as percentage of GDP (calculated 
from Eurostat data). All of them reduced substantially the size of our sample and none of them 
was found to be statistically significant, failing then to capture the potential positive impact of 
childcare availability on female participation. 
If labour market institutions had remained at the 1980's level the participation of women aged 
25-54 would have increased in the Netherlands almost 10% less than predicted, 15% less than 
predicted in Portugal or 20% less in the UK. By contrast, the development of labour market 
institutions has prevented participation rates from further increase in Italy and Finland; this is 
mainly due to the rise of unemployment benefit replacement ratio in these two countries. All 
this can be seen in the first panel of Chart 2, which gives an idea of the net contribution that the 
development of some of the variables considered in the regressions make to the total change in 
female labour force participation in each country. It compares changes in participation predicted 
 
19 We are most grateful to Florence Jaumotte for kindly allowing us to use tax and childcare related variables from her 
database. Jaumotte uses a proxy for relative tax rate on second earners at 67 % of APW (Average Production 
Worker earnings) calculated as the ratio between average tax rate on second earner earning 67 % of APW (with 
husband earning 100 per cent of APW, and two children) and average tax rate on a single individual earning 67% of 
APW. For more details see Jaumotte (2003). 
20 Ruhm (1998), Edin and Gustavsson (2005) Ondrich et al (2003) also found that very long parental leave could 
make it more difficult for women to return to work. 
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by our models with those obtained had specific explanatory variables remained constant since 
the beginning of the 1980s. 
Regarding the influence of prevailing economic conditions, their role is only captured by the 
unemployment rate, with a statistically significant and negative coefficient, which reflects 
discouragement effects, due to low attachment to the labour market. Our measure of aggregate 
wage turns to be non-significant despite several attempts to improve it. In order to account for 
the influence of potential earnings we constructed a measure of real wage for women using the 
average wage gap (unadjusted for skills) provided by Eurostat and gender weights in total 
employees. Data prior to 1994 was assumed on the basis of qualitative trends reported by the 
European Industrial Relations Observatory. This variable did not provide very satisfying results. 
Similarly, several interpolations of different indicators of education available on a 5 year 
average basis did not provide conclusive results.   
Turning to the results related to the relationship between fertility and participation, the variable 
fertility rates as such,21 turns out to be non-significant when imposing a common coefficient for 
all the countries, see column 1 to 4 in Table 1. If we allow for country specific coefficients, they 
turn out significant and negative for all the countries except for Sweden, the Netherlands and the 
UK for which the estimated coefficients are significant but positive. These results are not 
reported to save space (see instead column 5, which reports the result when we impose a 
common coefficient for all the countries with negative relationship and a different one for 
Sweden, the Netherlands, and the UK). In sum, even after controlling for other covariates, the 
relationship between fertility rates and participation rates seems to be quite heterogeneous 
across countries to the extreme of being positive in some cases and negative for the rest. 
Interpreting these positive coefficients in terms of causality, i.e. having more children causes 
female participation rates to be higher, could be quite adventurous.22 Rather, a positive 
relationship could be an indication that we have not fully controlled for some factors that make 
fertility and participation moving in the same direction in these three countries, obvious 
candidates could be childcare services or any other factor that helps to reconcile family and 
work. In other words, the coefficients could be simply partial correlations. Finding valid 
instruments could help to disentangle the casual relationship between fertility and participation 
rates. We attempt to do this in column 6 of Table 1, using lags of fertility rates and some 
indicators on the desirability of having children as instruments.23 After instrumenting the 
 
21 In the estimations reported in Table 1, fertility rates refer to women over 19 year of age, to exclude a potentially 
distorting effect of the high teenager’s fertility in the UK.  
22 Although, one could argue that having more kids will require higher family income and therefore be an incentive 
for women to work (provided that child care services are available). 
23 The social indicators are drawn from the World Values Survey and correspond to the average ideal number of 
children per family and the percentage of the sample that in each country thinks that the ideal number of children 
per family is three or more. 
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coefficients of fertility rates of Sweden, the Netherlands and the UK, they are still positive; this 
could shed some doubts about the adequacy of our instruments.  
The availability of part-time jobs, which can help women to reconcile work and family life, is 
found to have a positive influence on prime age female participation. The most remarkable 
cases are those of Belgium, Italy, and Ireland where according to chart 2a, keeping the ratio of 
part-time jobs at the initial level would have translated into a loss of around 30% of the total 
predicted increase in prime age participation, and of around 20% in the Netherlands. In the 
results shown in Table 1 we used the percentage of women (of all ages) working part-time as a 
proxy to the availability of part-time jobs. Alternatively, we tried the ratio of employment in 
services to total employment, since part-time jobs are mainly concentrated in the services sector 
and employment in the service sector has been booming over the last two decades. Results were 
very similar.  
Finally, we introduced the percentage of parliamentary seats occupied by women as a proxy for 
gender discrimination. This variable can be seen as reflecting the changing role of women in the 
society. Its coefficient is found to be positive but statistically significant only in a few 
specifications. 
3.2. Participation rates of older women
The participation rates of women aged 55 to 64 years old have slightly increased in most of the 
countries of our sample, with the exception of France and Finland. Sweden, Denmark, Ireland 
and the UK kept the highest participation rates during the whole sample period.  
In addition to the general determinants of participation previously discussed, older women’s 
participation decisions are expected to be influenced by some specific institutional features. 
Two specific institutions are considered in this group, both of them trying to capture the 
retirement system framework. The first one is the official retirement age, which should enable to 
take into account differences in the legal systems across countries. It has remained broadly 
stable over time in most countries, but the differences across countries are significant. The 
second institutional factor tries to capture differences in social protection across countries, by 
measuring the expenditure on social protection for old aged people as a percentage of GDP. In 
general, this ratio, which shows some heterogeneity in social protection at the country level, has 
increased over time, partly reflecting the ageing of the population in all European countries.24
The participation behaviour today of women aged 55-64 is quite likely to be linked to their 
participation decisions when they were 25-54 years old. In order to capture these cohort effects 
 
24 Variables on retirement systems are from Blöndal and Scarpetta (1999). For more details see Data Annex. 
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in our estimations, we also included as a covariate the participation rate of prime-age women 
lagged 10 years.25 
The results of the estimations are shown in Table 2. Starting with the cyclical factors, which are 
measured by the unemployment rate and real wages, both are found to be non-significant. When 
separating real wages by gender, although the signs are the expected ones (i.e. negative for 
males and positive for females) both are found to be non-significant. This suggests that 
participation of the oldest group is mainly explained by factors of a more structural nature. 
Indeed, Table 2 shows that cohort effects, which measure mainly preferences, but, indirectly, 
could also reflect institutions and social norms, play a determinant role in explaining the 
participation rate of this group. Chart 2b shows that keeping the cohort effect at the early 1980s 
levels would have resulted in a lower increased in participation levels in all the countries. 
Cohort effects have even prevented Italy, France, Finland, and Spain from null or negative 
(predicted) increases in participation.  
As regards the institutional framework, retirement age is, as expected, positively correlated with 
participation. In this case, however, we need to control for the influence of Spain in our panel, 
where the retirement age appears to be relatively less binding than in other countries (see 
columns 3 and 4, Table 2). Expenditure in old age social protection programmes is also found 
significant and has a negative effect on participation.26 By contrast, the expenditure, as 
percentage of GDP, on ALMP linked to this age group, i.e. training and employment subsidies 
were also introduced as regressors, but they resulted to be non-significant and therefore were 
not included in the table. Finally, most of the remaining labour market institutions, including 
union density, employment protection and labour taxes, have negative effects on participation. 
Remarkably, should labour market institutions have remained unchanged since 1980 in 
Germany, the Netherlands and Portugal, the change in participation would have halved that 
predicted by the model (see Chart 2b).  
3.3 Participation rates of young women
Young European women, aged 15 to 24 years, make up for a far more heterogeneous group than 
their elders as far as participation to the labour force is concerned. Their participation rate varies 
widely across countries, from no higher than 32% in Belgium to nearly 70% in the Netherlands 
in 2000. Yet, they all share two common characteristics. First, their participation rates are 
generally lower than that of prime-age women and higher than that of older women (aged 55 to 
64). Second, unlike their elders, participation rates of young women declined between the 1980s 
and the 1990s in virtually all European countries, with the remarkable exception of the 
 
25 Constructed using ten-year data published by the International Labour Office (ILO), which have been interpolated 
to obtain annual data by dividing the change homogeneously trough time.   
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Netherlands. On average, the participation rate of young European women fell by nearly 8 
percentage points between 1980 and 2000. The magnitude of that fall, however, differs 
substantially among countries. In general, countries with a high participation rate of young 
women in the 1980s (such as Denmark or the United Kingdom) saw less of a fall in 
participation. 
Along with the list of general determinants of participation discussed earlier, it is likely that 
young women are specifically influenced by three additional factors. First, enrolment in 
education appears to be extremely relevant for this age group. Young women may indeed decide 
either to continue studying in order to increase their skills and theirs chances to easily get a job 
in the future, or simply, to avoid being unemployed. Second, flexible types of contracts (i.e. 
temporary and part-time jobs) could be an incentive both for firms, since their costs are lower, 
and for workers, since they provide a temporary attachment or a “stepping stone” to get a better 
job. Third, the existence of minimum wages could exert a negative influence on the hiring of 
low productivity workers, and therefore reduce the expectations of young workers, who are 
likely to have less experience and lower productivity, to get a job and participate.  
Estimation results for the younger age group are presented in Table 3. As regards the role of 
institutions, taxes appear to consistently discourage the labour supply of young women in all 
estimations. Labour taxes increased in all European countries (but the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom) between the 1980s and the 1990s. Their significant negative influence on 
participation may suggest that, for young women, the substitution effect of taxes exceeds the 
favourable income effect they might have on participation. In other words, participating in the 
labour force would not bring along sufficient income to make participation worthwhile 
compared with staying out of the labour force. The other two institutional features that also 
appear to have a strong influence on young female participation rates are employment 
protection and the duration of unemployment benefits. Employment protection is expected to 
reduce the employability of young workers relative to more experienced and productive 
workers. The role that unemployment benefits may play is in principle less clear, but the 
negative sign indicates that, like for the other groups, is strengthening the union bargaining 
power of the insiders and reducing outsiders’ employability. By contrast, when considering the 
impact of the overall expenditure in ALMP (as % of GDP), and of the youth measures in 
particular, we found that both have a positive influence in participation, although only the 
overall measure turns out to be significant. Looking at country details (Chart 2c), we find that 
changes in labour institutions did not have a homogenous impact across countries. For example, 
the impact of labour institutions counteracted the decrease in young female participation in most 
 
26 Blöndal and Scarpetta (1999) find that this variable does not influence participation decisions for older males. Our 
result for females can be possibly explained by a lower degree of attachment of older females to the labour market. 
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European countries, but it had a clear worsening effect in some others (in particular, France, 
Ireland and Italy).  
Economic conditions have a significant impact on the participation rate of young women. The 
lower the unemployment rate the higher is participation. This surely illustrates the 
discouragement effect; positive economic developments increase the probability to find a job 
and attract people on the labour market. Inversely, sluggish developments on that same labour 
market discourage people from participating. Wage variables give unsatisfying results although 
several different variables have been tested. Neither aggregate real average wages (e.g. equation 
4, Table 3) nor female real wages (equation 6, Table 3) seem to matter in explaining young 
women participation. However, this may only be due to the shortcomings of our wage variables. 
Similarly, a variable measuring minimum wages is found insignificant. Once again, this may be 
due to data shortcomings. Information on minimum wage is available for no more than 5 
countries, so that estimations including minimum wage reduce the number of observations by 
more than half. Moreover, countries which do not have a statutory minimum wage (namely 
Denmark, Germany, Italy, Ireland, Sweden and the United Kingdom) may nevertheless have 
other means to ensure a minimum remuneration (via collective agreements for example). We 
have tried specifications including the level of minimum wage, a dummy for the existence of a 
statutory minimum wage and the interaction of this dummy with the level of minimum wage, 
without success. We therefore decided to leave minimum wage out of our estimations. 
As expected, enrolment in the education system seems to affect negatively the participation rate 
of young women. There is no doubt that the continued rise of the proportion of young people in 
education observed in our sample has been accompanied by a significant reduction of the 
participation rate of this group. Chart 2c confirms the importance that education enrolment has 
had on all European countries for young participation rates. Like fertility decisions for prime-
age women, education enrolment could present some endogeneity problems. Going to university 
or going to find a job can indeed be intermingled decisions. Therefore, in an attempt to control 
for potential endogeneity problems, education enrolment has been instrumented using lags. 
Table 3 also includes estimates of the impact of the part-time ratio on young female 
participation. In order to take into account the likely endogeneity problem attached to the use of 
a part-time ratio specific to the youngest age group, we reported the results with the share of 
part-time employment in the 15-64 age group. Results show that part-time contracts have a 
positive influence on participation. Chart 2c shows, with the only exception of Denmark, part-
time employment has significantly contributed to limit the decline in young female participation 
rates. In an alternative estimation (column 5, Table 3) we have also included the temporary ratio 
but it does not appear to be significant. This can be due to the fact that these types of contracts 
can interact between themselves, i.e. part-time contracts can be temporary or permanent, and 
therefore some overlap may arise.  
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Apparently, these results confirm the influence of the institutional framework in explaining the 
participation rates of young European women. More importantly, choices of further education or 
flexible types of work seem to play a prominent role. Yet, staying at school or at university, 
albeit surely depending on preferences, may indirectly be highly influenced by the government 
subsidies and grants to education, which in Europe are significantly larger that on the other side 
of the Atlantic. Similarly, flexible types of work are generally more highly regulated in Europe 
than they are in the United States, pointing to further indirect influence of the institutional 
sphere. 
4. Conclusions 
Why don’t European women work more? Is it due to the burden of excessively stringent labour 
market institutions or to general preference for leisure? By stepping away from the micro-
analysis of individual determinants of participation, this study provides an interesting viewpoint 
from which to consider the question. 
Our paper discards any doubt on the influence of institutions on women’s participation. For all 
three age groups considered, the strictness of labour market institutions negatively affects 
participation decisions. Indeed, the declining tightness of the institutional framework ruling 
labour markets in some countries over the last two decades appears to have significantly 
favoured women’s participation, in particular of the older age group. We also found that 
measures aimed at reconciling motherhood with professional life, such as maternity leave, 
should favour participation to the labour force. 
Furthermore, a number of specific decisions appear to have driven participation developments 
of different age groups. For example, for the younger age group, the increasing use of flexible 
forms of work (such as part-time employment) has been found to explain a large part of 
participation developments between the 1980s and the 1990s. Education enrolment, which can 
be seen as an alternative to finding a job or being unemployed, has been a major driving force 
behind the decline in young female participation. Turning to prime-age women, a fertility 
variable, which can be seen as the outcome of the decision to have children versus participation 
to the labour force, significantly curbs labour force participation. These decisions, although 
linked to preferences or social norms at first glance, could be also heavily shaped by the 
changing institutional framework. Finally, the participation of oldest age group appears 
significantly influenced by the lifetime behaviour of older women. If they did not participate at 
an earlier age, they are not likely to participate at an older age. This points to the weight and 
influence of cultural habits, which may also be reflected in the institutional framework.  
As pointed out in the introduction of this paper, identifying all factors influencing female labour 
force participation is a pre-requisite to the successful design of efficient policy measures that 
can bring inactives to the labour force. This paper takes a step in that direction by showing that 
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there is evidence that institutional factors, together with preferences and economic factors have 
shaped female participation decisions. 
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Table 1: Panel data estimates of participation rates. Prime-age females 25-54 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)* 
Labour market institutions 
 
UB Replc. Ratio -0.273 
(-2.44) 
-0.263 
(-2.36) 
-0.287 
(-2.17) 
-0.218 
(-1.81) 
-0.322 
(-3.61) 
-0.276 
(-2.64) 
UB duration -0.229 
(-2.10) 
-0.222 
(-2.03) 
-0.242 
(-2.13) 
-0.243 
(-2.18) 
-0.295 
(-3.07) 
-0.314 
(-3.03) 
Union density -1.250 
(-4.62) 
-1.247 
(-4.65) 
-1.238 
(-4.22) 
-1.204 
(-4.10) 
-0.768 
(-3.61) 
-0.763 
(-2.84) 
Empl. Protection 
 
0.085 
(0.78) 
0.098 
(0.82) 
 
Labour taxes 
 
0.317 
(1.07)  
 
Labour taxes - alternative 
 
-0.021 
(0.21) 
 
Group-specific institutional factors 
 
Maternity leave weeks 
 
0.034 
(3.43) 
0.024 
(2.13) 
Maternity leave weeks 
squared/100  
-0.049 
(-4.62) 
-0.036 
(-2.96) 
 
Other determinants 
 
Unemployment rate -0.014 
(-3.70) 
-0.014 
(-3.68) 
-0.014 
(-3.73) 
-0.014 
(-3.50) 
-0.006 
(-1.77) 
-0.017 
(-4.04) 
Real wage 0.137 
(1.48)      
Real wage – females 
 
0.154 
(1.74) 
0.149 
(1.63) 
0.153 
(1.67) 
0.121 
(1.59) 
0.090 
(0.98) 
Fertility rate -0.036 
(-0.50) 
-0.040 
(-0.55) 
-0.023 
(-0.33) 
-0.028 
(-0.39) 
-0.393 
(-4.93) 
-0.228 
(-2.06) 
Fertility rate* Sweden 
&Netherlands& UK  
1.318 
(7.96) 
0.907 
(3.37) 
Female part-time ratio 0.028 
(8.03) 
0.028 
(8.08) 
0.028 
(7.93) 
0.029 
(7.97) 
0.024 
(7.43) 
0.026 
(7.00) 
% Women Parliamentary 
seats 
0.003 
(1.13) 
0.002 
(1.07) 
0.003 
(1.32) 
0.003 
(1.29) 
0.003 
(1.45) 
0.002 
(1.08) 
Obs No. 196 196 196 196 184 184 
Except when indicated, estimations are performed by FGLS including time and country dummies. * 2 stages FGLS. 
Instruments included in the equation are lagged (3 to 5 lags) fertility, some indicators on the desirability of having 
children taken from the Word Values Survey, lagged unemployment (2 and 3 lags), productivity and output gap. t-
statistics in parentheses. Sample period: 1984-2000. Countries include Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK. For variable definitions see the text and annex. 
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Table 2: Panel data estimates of participation rates.  Old females 55-64 
 
Estimations are performed by 2 stages FGLS including time and country dummies. The instruments 
included in the equations are labour productivity, the output gap and lags. t-statistics in parentheses. Sample 
period: 1980-2000. Countries include Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, UK. For variable definitions see the text and annex. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Labour market institutions 
 
UB Replc. Ratio -0.067 
(-0.65) 
-0.056 
(-0.55) 
 
UB duration -0.318 
(-3.12) 
-0.300 
(-2.90) 
-0.301 
(-2.97) 
-0.269 
(-2.56) 
Union density -0.937 
(-3.74) 
-0.857 
(-3.31) 
-0.878 
(-3.54) 
-0.927 
(-3.53) 
Empl. Protection -0.487 
(-4.21) 
-0.481 
(-4.15) 
-0.480 
(-4.11) 
-0.472 
(-4.08) 
Labour taxes -0.469 
(-1.79) 
-0.457 
(-1.76) 
-0.516 
(-2.05) 
-0.434 
(-1.78) 
 
Group-specific institutional factors 
 
Old-age social protection (% GDP) -0.043 
(-2.65) 
-0.042 
(-2.59) 
-0.042 
(-2.59) 
-0.045 
(-2.97) 
Retirement age 0.003 
(0.11) 
0.007 
(0.30) 
0.119 
(7.39) 
0.115 
(6.89) 
Retirement age * Spain  -0.015 
(-4.40) 
-0.014 
(-4.47) 
 
Other determinants 
 
Unemployment rate 0.004 
(0.46) 
0.003 
(0.33) 
0.002 
(0.31) 
0.005 
(0.57) 
Real wage 
 
0.106 
(0.67) 
 0.125 
(0.79) 
 
Real wage – males 
 
-0.113 
(0.28) 
 -0.118 
(0.32) 
Real wage – females 
 
0.235 
(0.63) 
 0.189 
(0.53) 
Cohort effect 0.610 
(4.74) 
0.602 
(4.65) 
0.585 
(4.65) 
0.648 
(4.09) 
Obs. No. 236 236 236 236 
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Table 3:   Panel data estimates of participation rates. Young females 15-24 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Labour market institutions 
 
UB Replc. Ratio 0.218 
(1.32) 
0.131 
(0.70) 
0.163 
(0.86) 
 
UB duration -0.261 
(-2.21) 
-0.354 
(-3.04) 
-0.283 
(-2.39) 
-0.375 
(-3.23) 
-0.377 
(-3.26) 
-0.389 
(-3.29) 
Union density 0.085 
(0.26) 
-0.185 
(-0.53) 
0.039 
(0.11) 
 
Employment Protection -0.396 
(-2.81) 
-0.473 
(-3.43) 
-0.484 
(-3.40) 
-0.389 
(-2.81) 
-0.393 
(-2.64) 
-0.381 
(-2.84) 
Labour taxes -1.552 
(-3.96) 
-1.760 
(-4.22) 
-1.761 
(-4.19) 
-1.670 
(-4.05) 
-1.676 
(-3.78) 
-1.689 
(-4.19) 
Active labour market 
programmes (% GDP) 
 0.132 
(3.49) 
 0.138 
(3.88) 
0.122 
(3.41) 
0.160 
(5.07) 
Active labour market 
progr.--youth (% GDP) 
 0.065 
(0.69) 
 
Other determinants 
 
Unemployment rate -0.028 
(-5.67) 
-0.034 
(-6.45) 
-0.033 
(-6.29) 
-0.033 
(-6.52) 
-0.034 
(-5.35) 
-0.034 
(-6.65) 
Real wage -0.533 
(-2.27) 
-0.032 
(-1.26) 
-0.568 
(-2.45) 
-0.281 
(-1.22) 
-0.260 
(-1.25) 
 
Real wage females  -0.002 
(-0.02) 
Young in education -0.021 
(-3.25) 
-0.021 
(-3.08) 
-0.018 
(-2.64) 
-0.025 
(-3.53) 
-0.027 
(-4.03) 
-0.026 
(-4.02) 
Part-time ratio 15-64 0.019 
(3.20) 
0.021 
(4.10) 
0.019 
(3.70) 
0.020 
(4.08) 
0.020 
(3.70) 
0.021 
(4.38) 
Temporary employment  0.057 
(0.28) 
 
Obs. No. 172 167 167 167 167 167 
Estimations are performed by 2 stages FGLS including time and country dummies. The instruments included in the 
equations are labour productivity, the output gap and lags. t-statistics in parentheses. Sample period: 1985-2000. 
Countries include Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
UK. For variable definitions see the text and annex. 
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Chart 1: Labour force participation in the EU 
(as a percentage of working age population) 
45
55
65
75
85
19
77
19
79
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
Females Males Both gender
Source: OECD. 
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Chart 2: Contribution of different factors to participation developments(*) 
(in percentage points) 
a: women 25 to 54 years old 
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b: women 55 to 64 years old 
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c: women 15 to 24 years old 
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(*) This chart compares predicted changes in participation with those obtained if specific explanatory variables are 
maintained at the levels of 1980, in order to show the relevance of the developments in each selected variable to 
explain changes in participation. As regards institutions, all institutional determinants shown in Tables 1 to 3 are 
considered (models 4, 3 and 4 respectively), excluding those that are non-significant. Finland and Sweden are not 
shown in chart c, given that the predicted series is too short.   
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ANNEX: data sources and definitions 
Participation rate: defined as the percentage of people in the labour force in the total working age 
population. The total labour force (or currently active population) comprises all persons aged 15 to 64 
who are either employed or actively looking for a job. The working age population comprises all people 
aged between 15 and 64 years old. The data on participation rates and unemployment rates are derived 
from the annual European Community Labour Force Survey, which has been conducted every year in the 
spring since 1983.27 OECD and ILO data have been used to extend participation rates back to 1980. 
Unemployment rate: defined as the percentage of people actively looking for a job into the labour force. 
The data on unemployment rates are derived from the annual European Community Labour Force Survey, 
which has been conducted every year in the spring since 1983. OECD data have been used to prolong the 
unemployment rate back to 1980. 
Real wage: defined as overall nominal compensation of employees (national account concept) deflated by 
the consumption deflator, obtained from the European Commission AMECO database. Male and female 
real wage have been calculated using annual Eurostat statistics on the average wage gap between male 
and female workers, non adjusted for the development of part-time. 
Vacancy rate: defined as the number of vacant jobs as a percentage of the labour force. Vacancy data are 
obtained from the OECD.  
Fertility rate: defined as the mean number of children that would be born alive to a woman during her 
lifetime if she were to pass her childbearing years conforming to the fertility rates by age of a given year. 
It is obtained from the NewCronos database, Eurostat. 
Part-time ratio: defined as the fraction of part-time workers in total employment, obtained from the annual 
European Community Labour Force Survey. 
Services ratio: defined as the percentage of employment in the services sector, obtained from the 
European Commission AMECO database.  
Old-age social protection: includes old age pensions and the provision of goods and services (other than 
medical care) to the elderly, as a percentage of GDP. These data are drawn from European Social 
Statistics, Eurostat. 
Children benefit: Three measures of children benefits were used. First, a measure including support (other 
than medical care) in connection with pregnancy, childbirth and the care of children and other dependent 
family members, as a percentage of GDP. These data are drawn from European Social Statistics, Eurostat. 
Second, we used monthly family allowances for the first, second and third child as a percentage of 
monthly earnings. These data are drawn from the Gauthier database (2003). Finally, a third measure refers 
to public childcare spending per child in formal day care and pre-primary school (from Jaumotte, 2003).  
Maternity/parental leave: refers to the official duration of maternity/parental leave in the event of a child 
birth (in weeks). In some countries, this leave may be shared between parents. The data is drawn from the 
Comparative Maternity, parental, and childcare leave and benefits database (Gauthier, 2001). 
Women parliamentary seats: defined as the percentage of seats in the national parliament occupied by 
women. United Nations Statistics and ECB calculations. 
Unemployment benefit replacement ratio: refers to first year of unemployment benefits, averaged over 
family types of recipients, as a percentage of average earnings before tax. Data are taken from Labour 
Market Statistics Database, Nickell and Nunziata (2001). 
Unemployment benefit duration: obtained as a weighted average of the replacement rate received the 
second and third years of unemployment and in the fourth and fifth years, relative in both cases to the 
replacement rate in the first year. Data are taken from Labour Market Statistics Database, Nickell and 
Nunziata (2001). 
Union density: defined as the ratio of union members to total employees. Data are taken from Labour 
Market Statistics Database, Nickell and Nunziata (2001). 
 
27 Eurostat compiles these data and a detailed description of the sampling methods and adjustment procedures can 
be found in the latest Labour Force Survey – Methods and definitions, 1998. There is no information available for 
countries before they joined the European Union (i.e. for Spain and Portugal prior to 1986, for Austria and 
Finland prior to 1995). The series were extended to 1980, whenever possible, using OECD Labour Force 
Statistics or directly, relevant national sources. German data prior to 1991 only refer to West Germany. 
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Employment protection: measures in a range between 0 and 2 the strictness of employment protection. 
Data are taken from Labour Market Statistics Database, Nickell and Nunziata (2001). 
Labour taxes: Two measures were used. The first tax measure is defined as the sum of the employment 
tax rate, the direct tax rate and the indirect tax rate. Data are taken from Labour Market Statistics 
Database, Nickell and Nunziata (2001). The second tax measure is defined as the sum of total personal 
income tax and employees’ social security contributions minus the cash benefits, as a percentage of total 
gross wages. Data are then taken from the OECD tax database. 
Active labour market programmes (ALMP): Public expenditure on labour market programmes expressed 
as a percentage of GDP. It covers five main categories, from which we have focussed on labour market 
training, youth measures and subsidised employment. OECD. 
Retirement age: defined as the official retirement age. Data are taken from Blöndal S. and S. Scarpetta 
(1999). 
Minimum wage: defined as the ratio of the minimum wage to the medium wage. OECD. 
World Value Survey: The World Values Survey is a worldwide investigation of socio-cultural and 
political change, conducted by a network of social scientists at leading universities all around the world. 
Interviews have been carried out with nationally representative samples of the general public in more than 
80 countries. A total of four waves have been carried out since 1981 (more information is available on 
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/). During our investigation we tested survey replies to questions such 
as “What do you think is the ideal size of the family? How many children, if any?” 
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NOTE
What follows are  tables A1, A2 and A3 (mentioned in the cover letter) aiming 
at illustrating the results, not shown in the paper,  when we addressed the 
referee’s suggestion to introduce among our explanatory variables some 
measures of Active Labour Market Policies (ALMP) as described in Martin 
(2000) and Martin and Grubb (2001). 
 These tables are only for information. 
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TABLE A1:  Panel data estimates of participation rates. Prime-age  females 25-54
Specification as column 6  of table 1 (page 20) with ALMP variables  
Labour market institutions 
-0.276 -0.341 -0.344 -0.343 -0.34 -0.341UB Replac Ratio
(2.76)** (2.40)* (2.38)* (2.31)* (2.36)* (2.36)*
-0.314 -0.342 -0.345 -0.344 -0.345 -0.337UB Duration
(3.17)** (3.21)** (3.26)** (3.29)** (3.35)** (3.18)**
-0.763 -0.778 -0.822 -0.86 -0.789 -0.857Union Density
(2.97)** (3.04)** (3.21)** (3.35)** (3.06)** (3.34)**
0.004ALMP total expenditure as  % 
GDP (0.12)
-0.004ALMP traing+ Emp subs 
%GDP). (0.1)
-0.049 -0.049ALMP training (%GDP)
(0.87) (0.87)
0.001 0.001ALMP: Emply. 
Subsidies(%GDP) (0.02) (0.02)
Group specific institutions 
0.024 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.029 0.024Maternity leave weeks
(2.23)* (2.15)* (2.20)* (2.23)* (2.47)* (2.14)*
-0.036 -0.035 -0.036 -0.035 -0.04 -0.033Maternity leave weeks
squared/100 (3.10)** (2.97)** (3.00)** (2.97)** (3.30)** (2.88)**
Other determinants
0.09 0.106 0.116 0.118 0.123 0.117Real wage - females
(1.02) (1.13) (1.23) (1.24) (1.31) (1.24)
-0.228 -0.243 -0.235 -0.198 -0.254 -0.203Fertility rate
(2.16)* (3.61)** (4.00)** (3.61)** (3.54)** (3.95)**
0.907 0.97 0.916 0.962 0.966 -0.017fertility rate * SWD&NL&UK
(3.53)** (3.92)** -1.76 (3.90)** (3.73)** (3.61)**
-0.017 -0.018 -0.017 -0.016 -0.016 0.965unemployment rate 
(4.23)** -1.82 (3.55)** )1.45) (1.9) (1.5)
0.026 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.028 0.026female part-time ratio
(7.32)** (7.11)** (7.17)** (7.04)** (7.61)** (6.89)**
0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002% women in parlamentary 
seats (1.13) (0.99) (1.04) (0.91) (1.00) (0.89)
0.393 1.572 0.864 0.249 0.809 2.094Constant
(0.71) (3.62)** (2.95)** (0.45) (2.78)** (4.86)**
Obs. No 184 175 175 175 175 175
2 stages FGLS. Instruments included in the equation are lagged (3 to 5 lags) fertility, some indicators on the 
desirability of having children taken from the Word Values Survey, lagged unemployment (2 and 3 lags), productivity 
and output gap. t-statistics in parentheses. Sample period: 1984-2000. Countries include Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK. For variable definitions 
see the text and annex.
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TABLE A2:  Panel data estimates of participation rates. Prime-age  females 25-54
Specification as column 5 of table 1 (page 20)  with additionally ALMP variables  
Labour market institutions 
-0.322 -0.37 -0.375 -0.364 -0.388 -0.366UB Replac Ratio
(3.61)** (3.03)** (3.01)** (2.91)** (3.15)** (3.03)**
-0.295 -0.332 -0.334 -0.337 -0.371 -0.317UB Duration
(3.07)** (3.19)** (3.41)** (3.32)** (3.83)** (3.17)**
-0.768 -0.801 -0.824 -0.78 -0.785 -0.813Union Density
(3.61)** (3.73)** (3.89)** (3.62)** (3.78)** (3.79)**
-0.007ALMP total expenditure as  % 
GDP (0.27)
-0.015ALMP training + Employm. 
subsidies (%GDP) (0.48)
-0.07 -0.067ALMP training (%GDP)
(1.38) (1.33)
0.008 0.009ALMP: Emply. Subsidies(%GDP)
(0.20) (0.23)
Group specific institutions 
0.034 0.034 0.038 0.034 0.038 0.036Maternity leave weeks
(3.43)** (3.24)** (3.77)** (3.30)** (3.71)** (3.54)**
-0.049 -0.046 -0.052 -0.047 -0.053 -0.049Maternity leave weeks
squared/100 (4.62)** (4.32)** (4.85)** (4.37)** (4.86)** (4.59)**
Other determinants
0.121 0.151 0.161 0.142 0.137 0.16Real wage – females
(1.59) (1.91) (2.04)* (1.82) (1.78) (2.03)*
-0.393 -0.44 -0.436 -0.441 -0.443 -0.436Fertility rate
(4.93)** (4.94)** (4.94)** (4.93)** (5.07)** (4.91)**
1.318 1.345 1.373 1.349 1.358 1.366fertility rate * SWD&NL&Uk
(7.96)** (8.00)** (8.23)** (7.98)** (8.32)** (8.09)**
-0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005unemployment rate 
(1.77) (1.72) (1.42) (1.89) (1.85) (1.50)
0.024 0.025 0.026 0.025 0.026 0.025female part-time ratio
(7.43)** (7.53)** (7.72)** (7.52)** (8.08)** (7.49)**
0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003% women in parlamentary seats
(1.45) (1.16) (1.26) (1.21) (1.29) (1.22)
-0.234 0.97 0.896 0.97 0.943 0.917Constant
(0.57) (4.20)** (3.89)** (4.18)** (4.15)** (3.97)**
Obs. No 184 175 175 175 175 175
Except when indicated, estimations are performed by FGLS including time and country dummies.
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For Peer ReviewEstimations are performed by 2 stages FGLS including time and country dummies. The instruments included 
in the equations are labour productivity, the output gap and lags. t-statistics in parentheses. Sample period: 
1980-2000. Countries include Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, UK. For variable definitions see the text and annex.
Table A3: Panel data estimates of participation rates.  Old females 55-64
Specification as column 3  of table 2 (page 21)   with additionally ALMP variables
Labour market institutions
UB duration -0.301
(-2.97)
-0.302
(-2.68)
-0.273
(-2.53)
Union density -0.878
(-3.54)
-0.767
(-2.63)
-0.735
(-2.56) 
Empl. Protection -0.480
(-4.11)
-0.514
(-4.05)
-0.532
(-4.42)
Labour taxes -0.516
(-2.05)
-0.340
(-1.10)
-0.311
(-1.00)
ALMP total expenditure as  % GDP 0.000
(0.01)
ALMP training (%GDP) -0.082
(-1.12)
ALMP: Emply. Subsidies(%GDP) -0.073
(-1.30)
Group-specific institutional factors
Old-age social protection (% GDP) -0.042
(-2.59)
-0.019
(-1.02)
-0.019
(-0.96) 
Retirement age 0.119
(7.39)
0.116
(7.05)
0.112
(6.81)
Retirement age * Spain -0.015(-4.40)
-0.010
(-3.01) 
-0.010
(-2.80)
Other determinants
Unemployment rate 0.002
(0.31)
-0.006
(-0.70)
-0.005
(-0.63)
Real wage 0.125
(0.79)
0.212
(1.15)
0.157
(0.83)
Cohort effect 0.585
(4.65)
0.577
(3.03)
0.606
(3.38)
Obs. No. 236 205 205
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